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Abstract To explain the stability of cooperation is a central task of evolutionary theory. We
investigate this question in the case of quorum sensing (QS) bacteria, which regulate coopera-
tive traits in response to population density. Cooperation is modeled by the prisoner’s dilemma,
where individuals produce a costly public good (PG) that equally benefits all members of a
community divided into multiple, distinct patches (multilevel selection). Cost and benefit are
non-linear functions of the PG production. The analysis of evolutionary stability yields an op-
timization problem for the expression of PG in dependency on the number of QS individuals
within a colony. We find that the optimal total PG production of the QS population mainly
depends on the shape of the benefit. A graded and a switch-like response is possible, in accor-
dance with earlier results. Interestingly, at the level of the individual cell, the QS response is
determined by the shape of the costs. All QS individuals respond either homogeneously if cost
are a convex function of the PG production rate, or they respond heterogeneously with distinct
ON/OFF responses if the costs are concave. The latter finding is consistent with recent exper-
imental findings, and contradicts the usual interpretation of QS as a mechanism to establish a
uniform, synchronized response of a bacterial population.
Mathematics Subject Classification (2010) 92D25 · 91A22
1 Introduction
The evolutionary stability of bacterial cooperation is still not fully understood [11]. Kin selec-
tion (Hamilton’s rule [23]) and multilevel selection [41, 46] are standard explanations for the
appearance and stability of cooperation across all domains of life [15,54–56]. Multilevel evolu-
tion takes into account that individuals do not live in a homogeneous population, but in patches
or colonies, which leads to hierarchical models [41]. However, bacteria do not act blindly, but
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have means to sense aspects of their social and physical environment. In response to this in-
formation, they show plasticity and adapt their strategy [45]: In many cases, cooperation or
defection is not only determined by the genotype, but also by phenotypic plasticity. The most
prominent system that controls cooperation is quorum sensing (QS): Bacteria produce and re-
spond to a relatively cheap signaling molecule, allowing inference about the number of other
QS bacteria in close proximity, or about the diffusivity of the environment [47]. Such a regula-
tory system enables the population to delay a costly cooperative activity, such as the release of
public goods (PG), until the population size is sufficiently large to ensure effective change of
the environment [40, 42].
Intuitive examples of PGs are secreted antibiotics or virulence factors, which will only ef-
fectively kill competitor species or destroy host cells if a certain minimum concentration is
exceeded [43]. QS can also ensure efficient use of a secreted enzyme [9, 12]: Secretion into a
large volume of surrounding medium by an isolated bacterial cell will strongly dilute the en-
zyme and its products by diffusion. Secretion will be efficient only if many bacteria contribute
in a synchronous manner.
If QS is considered in the framework of multilevel selection, it can be interpreted as a way
to infer information about kinship, and in this to connect kin selection and kin recognition with
multilevel selection [10,48,50]. In many cases, cooperation under control of QS is able to invade
other bacterial communities more effectively, or to better resist invasion by others [2,10,38]. For
example, QS individuals are more efficient than constitutive cooperators in controlling cheater
mutants that exploit cooperation [10]. QS individuals will stop to cooperate in patches with a
high frequency of defectors (kin recognition), and in this, the tragedy of the commons can be
moderated. Combinations of methods from population genetics and the concept of multilevel
selection seem to indicate that cheating mutants are not able to persist as a result of frequency-
dependent selection, but are repeatedly created by spontaneous mutations and are subsequently
eliminated. The observed mutants are the result of this birth-death process [52].
Most work is done for homogeneous populations. In this case, the invasion analysis leads to
the optimization problem to use resources in an optimal way (see below and [26]). It has been
argued that either a gradual increase of cooperativeness or a synchronized all-or-nothing strat-
egy can be the best choice for the population, depending on the phenotype under control [26].
Observed heterogeneity has been attributed to spatial effects or general environmental hetero-
geneity [28]. That is, the idea here is that the environment that QS individuals sense is subject
to variability. However, one of the central assumptions of QS is that it serves to synchronize
populations in their response, even if the environment is heterogeneous. Only the quorum mat-
ters [27]. Differences in the environment of single population members are thought to be over-
written by the QS signal [38]. According to this explanation, heterogeneity in bacteria should
not play a major role.
Recent experimental results show that a heterogeneous phenotype in QS populations is sur-
prisingly common (see e.g., [3,4,21,22,34,35,49,53] and literature cited therein). These results
call for a theoretical explanation. We focus on these experimental findings and extend the mul-
tilevel selection approach to explain this behavior. We find that it is central to acknowledging
the nonlinear dependency of costs and benefit on PG production. In the first part of the paper,
we introduce the basic model and perform an evolutionary multilevel analysis in the case of a
homogeneously responding population and linear cost/benefit characteristics. We were able to
recover expected outcomes and also to extend them. In the second part, we augment the model
to allow for nonlinear dependency of cost/benefit on the PG production in a similar way as in
ref. [26]. Furthermore, we allow for heterogeneity, that is, for different responses of individuals.
It is possible to characterize the effect of evolutionary forces on the behavior of single bacteria.
Of course, not in all settings is a heterogeneous response optimal; sometimes a homogeneous
response of the population is more efficient. Our model allows us to differentiate between causes
that lead to a homogeneous and non-homogeneous response, respectively.
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On the colony/population level, a gradual response as well as a sudden increase in the PG
production can be observed, if the number/fraction of QS individuals in a population is in-
creased. We find that mainly the shape of the benefit determines which of the two possibilities
is optimal.
In contrast to the original interpretation of QS as a mechanism that ensures a homogeneous
response of bacterial communities, our model strongly predicts that QS systems controlling a
cooperative phenotype are expected to respond often in a heterogeneous manner if the costs
depend in a concave way on the PG production. This conclusion is based on the following con-
siderations: as the PG is available to all cells within a colony, the fitness differences of bacteria
within this colony are not affected by the amount of PG. In contrast, the costs are different
for bacteria with different strategies. Therefore the costs for PG production are more important
for the single-cell level than the benefit. The second observation is that the nature of the costs
determines the optimal QS strategy: A homogenous response is favored if the costs increase
in a convex way as a function of the production rate (to produce PG at twice the rate is less
than twice as costly). A heterogenous response is favored, in contrast, if the costs increase in a
concave way. We discuss plausible biological scenarios in which the costs of PG production are
either concave or convex.
2 Mathematical Model
We performed an invasion analysis of defectors (D), constitutive cooperators (C) and quorum
sensing bacteria (QS). Cooperation is, as usual for conceptual models, described by the pris-
oners dilemma [30]. We do not consider pairwise interactions, but assume that a cooperator
produces PG continuously (at some costs) that is equally shared among all individuals within
the community. The population is organized into distinct colonies, which leads to multilevel
evolution. This setting is well suited for the investigation of cooperation [41], in particular in
case of bacterial cooperation [37].
We start with the description of a single bacterial colony consisting of two types (an abundant
resident and a rare invader) in section 2.1. In particular, we define the fitness functions in this
context. Afterwards, in section 2.2, we turn to the investigation of many colonies in parallel,
basically using a variant of the time-continuous Price equation [13]. In section 2.3 we extend
the standard prisoners dilemma allowing for nonlinear dependencies of costs/benefit on PG pro-
duction and for heterogeneity in the response of the population on the level of individuals, in a
similar manner as in threshold games [14]. The most important functions and parameters of the
model used are listed in Table 1.
2.1 One colony
Let us consider a colony, founded by N bacteria. We assume that we have a resident population
with number Rt , and an invading population with number It at time t. In the present section,
initial conditions R0 and I0 are deterministically given and not random – this assumption will
be changed when we move on to the multilevel analysis. Each individual may always defect
(D), may always cooperate (C), or may adapt its behavior according to the fraction of QS-
individuals in the population (QS strategy). Let us number the individuals in the colony at time
t by i ∈ {1, . . . ,Rt + It}. We assign to each individual a variable Qit that indicates the degree
at which the individual cooperates: Qti = 0 for defectors or a non-cooperating QS-individual,
Qti = 1 for cooperators or a fully cooperating QS individual. In contrast to C and D individuals,
QS individuals sense the environment and thereby acquire information about the fraction of
QS individuals within the population. They can adapt the degree of cooperation accordingly.
If QS-individuals produce PG at a positive but not maximal rate, Qti ∈ (0,1) represents the
actual chosen production rate. This rate is normalized, s.t. Qti =
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Symbol meaning
N initial number of individuals within a colony
R, I number of resident/invader individuals within a colony
Q, Qi degree of cooperativeness (of individual i)
Q∗ optimal degree of cooperativeness
f (Q,Qi) fitness of individual with coop. Q, in a population with coop. (Qi)i=1,...,N
F ′c (0),F ′(0) initial growth rate of invaders in one colony/over all colonies
x fraction of residents within a colony
y fraction of invaders within a colony
QR(x) degree of cooperativeness among residents (homogeneous population)
QI(y) degree of cooperativeness among invaders (homogeneous population)
Ec(.),Eg(.) expectation within one colony/over all colonies
c, b costs and benefit of Prisoners Dilemma
r relatedness
p initial fraction of invaders
C(Q) costs for PG production at given cooperativeness
B(Q) benefit of PG’s produced at given cooperativeness
Λν (Q) initial slope in time of the expected invaders fraction (ν QS individuals)
Table 1.Most important symbols and functions and their interpretation.
production rate. The cell regulatory pathways of QS often incorporate a positive feedback loop.
It depends on the parameters of this feedback loops if we find at the single-cell level a graduate
response or an all- or nothing response [19]. We assume that the sensing apparatus itself has
negligible costs.
Next we define the population dynamics. All bacteria divide at a certain rate, but do not
die. We have a time-continuous, stochastic birth process. The net birth rate, that takes into
account costs for and benefit from cooperation is the fitness of an individual. A constitutive
cooperator always has costs c, a QS-individual cooperating at degree Q ∈ [0,1] has costs Qc.
All cooperative individuals (C and QS) contribute to PG that is available to all colonymembers -
each individual within the colony receives a fair share. The available PG per individual is simply
given by b ∑
Rt+It
i=1 Q
t
i/(Rt + It) – of course, there is the usual time scale argument behind the
assumption: at a time scale that is short in comparison with reproduction, the PG concentration
tends to an equilibrium. Let us consider a population where individual i (i= 1, . . .νt = Rt + It)
cooperates at degree Qi. Select one of these individuals. If this focal individual cooperates at
degree Q, its fitness reads
f (Q;Q1, . . . ,Qνt ) = 1−Qc+ b
Rt+It
∑
i=1
Qi
Rt + It
. (1)
To guarantee a positive fitness, we assume throughout the paper that c∈ (0,1). In the first case a
homogeneously responding population is addressed. This is the case if all individuals of a given
type show the same response (degree of cooperativeness) to their social environment, such that
there are functions QR(x) resp. QI(y) that indicate the normalized PG production rate strength
of resident resp. invading population (where x = Rt/(Rt + It) resp. y = It/(Rt + It)). In case of
C (D) the functions are constant (QR/I(.) = 1 resp. QR/I(.) = 0). Only in the QS case, QR/I(.)
indeed depends on x resp. y.
We assume that the resident population only consists of one type (C, D, QS), and also the in-
vaders have all the same genotype. As we consider, at the time being, a homogeneous response,
all resident (invading) individuals have the same cooperation strength Qi = QR(x) if individual
i is a resident (Qi = QI(y) if i is an invader). Then,
Rt → Rt + 1 at rate 1−QR(x)c+ b
(
QR(x)Rt +QI(y) It
Rt + It
)
(2)
It → It + 1 at rate 1−QI(y)c+ b
(
QR(x)Rt +QI(y) It
Rt + It
)
. (3)
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Our main focus is the question if the invaders can spread. To be more precise, we want to know
if the fraction of invaders becomes larger or smaller in the first, small time interval. Thereto we
compute the expectation of this fraction for one single colony (which we denote by Ec(.)). Let
Fct = Ec(It/(Rt + It)). If
F ′c(0) :=
d
dt
Fct |t=0 > 0,
then the fraction of invaders increases initially.
Proposition 1 Let x = R0/N the initial fraction of residents, and y = 1− x, the initial fraction
of invaders. With the notation introduced above,
F ′c(0) = c
xy
1+ 1/N
(
QR(x)−QI(y)
)
.
Proof: In a small time interval ∆ t, the population will either stay constant, or increase by one
(we suppress the dependency on QR/I of x resp. y):
P(R∆ t = R0, I∆ t = I0) = 1−R0
(
1−QRc+ b
(
QRR0+QI I0
N
))
∆ t
−I0
(
1−QIc+ b
(
QRR0+QI I0
N
))
∆ t,
P(R∆ t = R0+ 1, I∆ t = I0) = R0
(
1−QRc+ b
(
QRR0+Qi I0
N
))
∆ t,
P(R∆ t = R0, I∆ t = I0+ 1) = I0
(
1−QIc+ b
(
QRR0+QI I0
N
))
∆ t,
and all other transitions have a probability of O(∆ t2). Thus (note that we know R0 and I0, that
is, F0 is known and not a random variable)
F ′c(0) = lim
∆ t→0
E(Fc∆ t)−Fc0
∆ t
= c
I0R0
N(N+ 1)
(
QR−QI
)
.

The proposition indicates that an invader can spread if QI <QR, that is, if the invader is less
cooperative. A central assumption here is the homogeneity of the population. Results of this
type are well known in case of Wright-Fisher and Moran models (where the total population
size is constant) with frequency dependent selection [18, 31].
Remark 2 The equation above is closely related to the replicator equation (which is developed
for the deterministic counterpart of our stochastic process). Standard arguments (Ethier and
Kutz [16]) indicate that the fraction y(t) = It/N approximates a deterministic dynamical system
for large N. From the argument above, we have (Rt/N = (N− It)/N = 1− y(t), y0 := I0/N)
that y′(0) = cy(0)(1− y(0))(QR(1− y(0))−QI(y(0)) ). As this equation is true for any initial
value y(0) = y0, we obtain the ODE y
′ = cy(1− y)( QR(1− y)−QI(y) ). This is the well-
known replicator equation for two species [30]. In this ODE, the solution y(t) always tends to
a stationary point. A stationary point y∗ is given either by y∗ = 0, by y∗ = 1 or by the condition
QR(1− y∗) = QI(y∗). That is, if defectors (Q = 0) competes with cooperators (Q = 1), the
cooperators always loose. If cooperators (Q= 1) compete with QS individualsQ=Q(y)∈ [0,1],
the fraction of QS individuals grows until either they all choose the strategy to fully cooperate
(Q(y)= 1), or the cooperators die out. In the same way, the fraction of QS individuals competing
with a defector population shrinks until they all stop to cooperate and behave as defectors (or
they die out).
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As a result, constitutive cooperators in a homogeneous population are never able to spread.
QS individuals can only persist in a defecting population if they all behave as defectors. Since
we assume that QS individuals that do not produce PG have no costs, their fitness is that of
defecting bacteria. Due to this symmetry, our model predicts that D and (non-cooperating) QS
individuals can coexist, but not D and cooperating QS individuals. This result does not explain
why we find cooperating QS individuals in experiments. However, the picture will change if
move on towards multilevel evolution.
2.2 Multilevel analysis of homogeneously responding QS individuals
We extend the analysis from only one colony to many colonies. For simplicity, all colonies
start with the very same population size N. However, the initial composition of a colony is not
deterministic (I0 is a random variable, R0 = N− I0). We introduce the expectation of a random
variable over all colonies: While Ec(It |I0 = i) denotes the expected number of invaders at time
t in one given colony with initial value I0 = i, Eg(It) is the average number of invaders over all
colonies, that is,
Eg(It) =
N
∑
i=0
Ec(It |I0 = i)P(I0 = i).
We aim at the dynamics of the fraction of invaders over all colonies. Assume that we have
M colonies numbered by j = 1, . . . ,M. In a given realization, the colony with number j starts
with I0 = i j invaders, where i j is selected according to some random law. The total number
of invaders (summarized over all colonies) reads ∑Mj=1(It |I0 = i j) while the total population is
∑Mj=1((Rt + It)|I0 = i j). We are interested in
∑Mj=1(It |I0 = i j)
∑Mj=1((Rt + It)|I0 = i j)
=
1
M ∑
M
j=1(It |I0 = i j)
1
M ∑
M
j=1((Rt + It)|I0 = i j)
. (4)
We aim atM→∞; therefore, we focus on one initial condition i0 ∈ {0, . . . ,N}, which has prob-
ability P(I0 = i0). In (4), it appears on average MP(I0 = i) times. That is, this initial condition
appears (either never a.s. if P(I0 = i0) = 0 or) very often if M becomes large. The law of large
numbers implies that the mean of a random variable over many realizations tends to its expec-
tation (under wide assumptions, which are given here [5]). Thus
F(t) := lim
M→∞
∑Mj=1(It |I0 = i j)
∑Mj=1((Rt + It)|I0 = i j)
=
∑Ni=1E(It |I0 = i)P(I0 = i)
∑Ni=1E((Rt + It)|I0 = i)P(I0 = i)
=
Eg(It)
Eg(Rt + It)
.
Though we consider a stochastic model, the limitM→∞ yields an infinite population size such
that the result is deterministic. Therefore, the following definition is appropriate.
Definition 3 Let
F ′(0) =
d
dt
Eg(It)
Eg(Rt + It)
∣∣∣∣
t=0
.
We say that I can invade R if F ′(0)> 0.
The important difference between F ′(0) and F ′c(0) is the reference population for the frac-
tion of invaders: In F ′c(0) we consider a single colony, in F ′(0) all colonies.
For the next proposition, recall that we still address homogeneously responding populations.
Proposition 4 Let x, y be random variables x = R0/N, y = I0/N, and p the initial fraction of
invaders, p= Eg(y). Then,
F ′(0) = (1− p)Eg
[
y
(−cQI(y)+ b (QR(x)x+QI(y)y))] (5)
−pEg
[
(1− y) (−cQR(x)+ b (QR(x)x+QI(y)y))]
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Proof: Recall R0+I0 =N in all colonies, that is, Eg(R0+I0) =N. In the following computation,
we partially suppress the argument of QI and QR; strictly spoken, QI = QI(y), y= (It/(Rt + It)
and QR = QR(x), x= (Rt/(Rt + It)). Then, we have
F ′(0) =
d
dt
Eg(It)
Eg(Rt + It)
− Eg(It)
Eg(Rt + It)
d
dt
Eg(Rt + It)
Eg(Rt + It)
∣∣∣∣
t=0
=
1
N
Eg
[
I0
(
1−QIc+ b
(
QRR0+QI I0
N
)) ]
−Eg(I0)
N
1
N
Eg
[
R0
(
1−QRc+ b
(
QRR0+QI I0
R0+ I0
))
+I0
(
1−QIc+ b
(
QRR0+QI I0
N
)) ]
= (1−Eg(y)) Eg
[
y
(
1−QI(y)c+ b(QR(x)x+QI(y)y)
) ]
−Eg(y) Eg
[
(1− y)
(
1−QR(x)c+ b(QR(x)x+QI(y)y)
) ]
The result follows with p= Eg(y).

We can use this proposition to investigate the conditions that are necessary for an invasion
of D by C, an invasion of D by QS, and an invasion of C by QS, where we only allow for a
homogeneous response (all residents resp. all invaders have the same Q)
Recall varg(y) = Eg(y
2)− (Eg(y))2. The next proposition reproduces the well-known Hamil-
ton’s rule.
Proposition 5 C can invade D, if
c< rb, r =
varg(y)
Eg(y)(1−Eg(y)) .
Proof:As the resident is a defector and the invader is a constitutive cooperator, we haveQR = 0
and QI = 1. Thus, with p= Eg(y),
F ′(0) = (1− p)Eg [y (−c + by)]− pEg [(1− y)by]
= −c p(1− p)+ b(Eg(y2)− p2) = p(1− p)
[
br− c].

Though in each colony the fraction of cooperators decreases, the colonies with many coop-
erators grow much faster than those with only few cooperators. Therefore, if r is large, cooper-
ation may spread (see figure 1). This explanation is a variation of the Simpsons paradox [6,7,25]
The next proposition is basically discussed in [2], using a slightly different notation. To be
self-contained, we reproduce the result using our notation.
Proposition 6 Let the resident be D, and the invader be QS. (a) F ′(0) is maximized by the
choice QI(y) = θ (y), where θ (y) = 1 for y≥ y∗, and θ (y) = 0 for y< y∗, where
y∗ = p+(1− p) c
b
.
(b) If QI(y) = θ (y), Eg(yθ (y))> 0 and
c< b,
then QS can invade in D.
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Proof: (a) We have QR(x) = 0, and QI(y) ∈ [0,1]. Then,
F ′(0) = (1− p)Eg
[
y
(−cQI(y)+ bQI(y)y)]− pEg [(1− y)bQI(y)y]
= Eg
[
yQI(y)
(
b(y− p)− c(1− p)
)]
.
As y is non-negative, the expression is maximized if QI(y) = 1 for b(y− p)−c(1− p)> 0, and
Q(y) = 0 if b(y− p)− c(1− p)< 0. If b(y− p)− c(1− p) = 0, the choice of Q(y) does not
matter. Now, b(y− p)−c(1− p)> 0 is equivalent with y> y∗. (b) Thus, if Eg(yθ (y))> 0, then
F ′(0)> 0.

Note that the optimization problem to maximize Eg
[
yQI(y)
(
b(y− p)−c(1− p)
)]
resem-
bles the optimization problem discussed in [26]. We obtain the “classical” behavior expected
of QS-bacteria: they are not cooperative if their population density is below a certain threshold,
and jump to full cooperation if the quorum is reached.
Fig 1. The fraction of the cooperator becomes smaller in each colony, but larger in the total
population (Simpsons paradox, see text). The reason is, that the colony with only few
cooperators grows much slower than that with many cooperators.
Proposition 7 Let the resident be C, and the invader be QS. Assume that QI(y) = θ (y), where
θ (y) = 1 for y≥ y∗, and θ (y) = 0 for y< y∗, where
y∗ = p+(1− p) c
b
.
If c< b and E(y(1−θ (y)))> 0, then QS can invade in C.
Proof: We have QR(x) = 1, and QI(y) = θ (y). Then,
F ′(0) = (1− p)Eg [y (−cθ (y)+ b(x+θ (y)y))]− pEg [(1− y) (−c + b(x+θ (y)y))]
= (1− p)Eg [y (−c + b + c(1−θ (y))− by(1−θ(y)))]
− pEg [(1− y) (−c + b − by(1−θ (y)))]
= Eg
[
y(1−θ (y))
(
c(1− p)− by+ bp
)]
.
As 1−θ (y) = 0 for y> y∗ and 1−θ (y)> 0 for y< y∗, and moreover, c(1− p)− by+ bp> 0
for y< y∗, we have that F ′(0)≥ 0. If, additionally, E(y(1−θ (y)))> 0, then F ′(0)> 0.
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Fig 2. The figure parallels figure 1. Since the QS-individuals act as cooperators in colony 2,
this colony evolves as colony 2 in figure 1. In colony 1, the QS-individuals behave as
defectors, such that (in the given example) almost no individual reproduces here.
Consequently, after the time step, the ratio of QS individuals in the total population is larger
than that of constitutive cooperator in figure 1. The bars indicate the total fraction of QS
individuals in the corresponding population (acting as cooperators or as defectors).

Naively, one would expect that QS individuals are always able to invade constitutive coop-
erators. However, if a QS individual fully cooperates, it has no advantage over cooperators (see
figure 2). Stochasticity leads to the appearance of some colonies that start with only few QS
bacteria. In these colonies, QS individuals will defect (at least initially), and have therefore an
advantage over the cooperators. Using this mechanism – the Simpson paradox – QS individuals
can successfully invade a C population.
Remark 8 As we are interested in an invasion analysis, Eg(I0) = p is small. Hence, in a good
approximation, y∗= c/b in proposition 6 and proposition 7. At the end of the day, QS individuals
do not cooperate until cooperation pays for each individual in the QS subpopulation: if y> y∗,
then 1− cθ (y)+ ybθ (y) > 1− c+ bc/b = 1. That is the case the fitness for the cooperating
phenotype is larger than that for the defecting phenotype. QS individuals do not cooperate in
the altruistic sense, but they only produce PG if it pays for each single QS-individual. This
observation is in line with the interpretation of quorum sensing as efficiency sensing [27]. The
fact that other QS-bacteria or other bacterial species benefit from the cooperative phenotype is
only a side effect. An individual maximizes its own fitness only.
2.3 Multilevel analysis for heterogeneously responding QS individuals
We extend the setting above. First of all, in general, the impact of PG is nonlinear. As e.g.
discussed in [26], it is important to take into account this nonlinear dependence. We use a
function B(.) to describe a non-linear beneficial effect of PG on the fitness of an individual.
Similarly, we assume that the costs do not depend linearly on the cooperativeness.We model the
costs by a nonlinear functionC(.). Later we will see that concave and convex functionsC(.) are
of special interest. We generalize our model also in a second point: Each single QS-individual
is allowed to choose its own degree of cooperativeness. In the last section, we had one single
function QI(y) that indicated the degree of cooperativeness for all invading QS individuals in
presence of a fraction y of QS-individuals. This time, we have a vector (Q1(y), . . .Qν (y))
T ∈
[0,1]ν (if the number of QS-individuals is ν), where Qi(y) represents the response of the i’th
10 Hense, Burkhard et al.
QS individual. We analyse the invasion of a defecting resident population by QS-bacteria. Let
the colony equal N. Then, the fitness of a QS-individual with cooperativenessQ is given by
fQS(Q;Q1, . . . ,Qν ) = 1−C(Q)+ 1
N
B
(
ν
∑
i=1
Qi
)
while that for the defector is given by
fD(Q1, . . . ,Qν ) = 1+
1
N
B
(
ν
∑
i=1
Qi
)
.
The degree of cooperation Q is a central ingredient of the model. Costs and benefit are allowed
to be non-linear functions on ∑νi=1Qi and Qi, respectively. This general setting might introduce
some arbitrary aspect. If we find B˜, C˜ and a monotonous function g, s.t.
B
(
ν
∑
i=1
Qi
)
= B˜
(
ν
∑
i=1
Q˜i
)
, C(Qi) = C˜(Q˜i)
where Q˜i = g(Qi), the interpretation of Qi as the normalized PG production rate might be diffi-
cult. The next lemma shows that, under reasonable assumptions, only trivial rescaling of Qi is
possible. We can choose the units used to measure Qi (namely the amount of PG contributed),
but not more.
Lemma 9 Assume that B′ > 0. If there is a function B˜ :R+→R+, B˜′(x)> 0 and B˜(0) = 0, and
a function g : R+ →R+ rescaling Q, such that
∀ν ∈N,(Q1, . . . ,Qν ) ∈ [0,1]ν : B
(
ν
∑
i=1
Qi
)
= B˜
(
ν
∑
i=1
g(Qi)
)
then g(x) = ax for some a> 0, and B˜(x) = B(x/a).
Proof: Consider ν = 3, and (Q1,Q2,Q3), such that ∑
3
i=1Qi = z ∈ R. We keep z fixed but vary
the Qi. Then,
B(z) = B(Q1+Q2+Q3) = B˜(g(Q1)+ g(Q2)+ g(Q3))
As B˜′(x)> 0, g(Q1)+g(Q2)+g(Q3) is constant for all feasible triples (Q1,Q2,Q3). Replacing
Q3 by z−Q1−Q2 and taking the derivative w.r.t. Q1, we obtain
g′(Q1)− g′(z−Q1−Q2) = 0
As Q2 can be chosen independently of Q1 (as long as Q1+Q2 ≤ z), this equation can be only
satisfied if g′(x) is constant. Let g′(x) = a, then g(x)= ax+b. As g :R+→R+, we have a,b≥ 0.
In order to determine b, we inspect Q1 = Q2 = Q3 = 0. Therefore z= 0, and
0= B(0) = B(z) = B˜(3g(0)) = B˜(3b).
Since B˜(0) = 0, and B˜′(x)> 0, we conclude b= 0. The choice a= 0 is not possible as otherwise
B˜(∑νi=1 g(Qi)) does not depend on Qi. Hence, a> 0 and our original equation reduces to
B
(
ν
∑
i=1
Qi
)
= B˜
(
a
ν
∑
i=1
Qi
)
.
This equality implies B˜(x) = B(x/a).

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We proceed with the investigation of the model. Thereto, we generalize the computation for
the expression F ′(0) above:
d
dt
Ec(It |I0 = ν)|t=0 = ν + ν
N
B
(
ν
∑
i=1
Qi
)
−
ν
∑
i=1
C(Qi),
d
dt
Ec(Rt |I0 = ν)|t=0 = (N−ν)+ N−ν
N
B
(
ν
∑
i=1
Qi
)
.
Thus, with p= Eg(I0)/N,
F ′(0) =
d
dt
Eg(It)
Eg(It +Rt)
=
N
∑
ν=0
P(I0 = ν)
[
ν
N
+
ν
N2
B
(
ν
∑
i=1
Qi
)
− 1
N
ν
∑
u=1
C(Qi)
−p
(
1+
1
N
b
(
ν
∑
i=1
Qi
)
− 1
N
ν
∑
u=1
C(Qi)
)]
=
N
∑
ν=0
P(I0 = ν)
[( ν
N
− p
) 1
N
B
(
ν
∑
i=1
Qi
)
− 1− p
N
ν
∑
u=1
C(Qi)
]
.
Corollary 10 QS individuals can invade a population of defectors if
F ′(0) =
N
∑
ν=0
P(I0 = ν)
[( ν
N
− p
) 1
N
B
(
ν
∑
i=1
Qi
)
− 1− p
N
ν
∑
u=1
C(Qi)
]
> 0. (6)
Evolutionary forces will maximize F ′(0). In order to maximize F ′(0), the term in the brackets
[...] is to maximize for each ν separately. We are particularly interested in the invasion by QS
individuals, that is, in p≪ 1. Therefore, we are allowed to neglect p and are led to the following
problem:
Problem 11 Assume that there are ν QS-individuals and N−ν D-individuals. Find Q∈ [0,1]ν ,
such that the function Λν : [0,1]
ν →R,
Λν(Q) =
ν
N
B
(
ν
∑
i=1
Qi
)
−
ν
∑
u=1
C(Qi) (7)
is maximized.
Remark 12 If we inspect this optimization problem, we find that
ν +Λν(Q) =
ν
∑
i=1
[
1+
1
N
B
(
ν
∑
ℓ=1
Qℓ
)
−C(Qi)
]
=
ν
∑
i=1
fQS(Qi;Q1, . . . ,Qν)
is the total fitness of the QS subpopulation. If Λ(.) is maximized, the total (and in this also the
average) fitness of the QS subpopulation is maximized. This result is in line with Fisher’s the-
orem of selection [17, 30]. This theorem states that evolution favors strategies which maximize
the average fitness of a population. Note here the difference between optimization of individual
fitness and average population fitness.
Since [0,1]ν is compact, B andC are continuous, we know that there is at least one solution
to this optimization problem.
Corollary 13 There is Q∗ ∈ [0,1]ν such that ∀Q ∈ [0,1]ν : Λν(Q)≤Λν(Q∗).
There are, in particular, two cases, where (at least one) optimum Q∗ can be characterized: if
C is convex resp. concave (see figure 3).
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Proposition 14 If C(.) is concave then there is one optimal solution Q∗, where all components
are in {0,1} but one. If additionally B(.) is convex, then all components are in {0,1}.
Before we show this proposition, we recall some well-known terms: a set in Rn is convex, if the
connecting line is always contained in the set. A convex simplex is the convex combination of a
finite number of vertices, also called extremal points. A function f is convex, if the connecting
line between two points on the graph of f always lies above or on the graph, f (τx+(1−τ)y)≤
τ f (x)+ (1− τ) f (y) for τ ∈ [0,1]. A function g is concave, if the converse is true, g(τx+(1−
τ)y) ≥ τg(x)+ (1− τ)g(y). If f is convex, then − f is concave and vice versa. If f is twice
differentiable and x ∈ R, f is convex (concave) if f ′′ ≥ 0 ( f ′′ ≤ 0). If x is element of a convex
set in Rn, f is convex (concave) if the Hessian matrix is positive (negative) semidefinite. A
convex function over a convex simplex assumes its maximum in a vertex (extremal point) of the
simplex. A vertex can be characterized by the fact that it cannot be represented by the convex
combination of two other points in the simplex.
The extremal points of [0,1]ν consists of all vectors with entries in {0,1}. As the last point of
this interlude, we state a well-known lemma about the extremal points of a certain convex set.
Let e= (1, . . . ,1)T . For a simplex set S , let Σ(S ) denote the vertices of a simplex S .
Lemma 15 Let θ ∈ R, and S = {x ∈ [0,1]n |eT x= θ} 6= /0. If xˆ ∈ Σ(S ) is an extremal point,
then at least n− 1 entries of x are in {0,1}.
Proof: Assume xˆ ∈ Σ(S ), and assume furthermore that xˆ has at least two components i0, i1 in
the open interval (0,1) (where i0 6= i1). Let zi0 =−1, zi1 = 1, and zi′ = 0 for all i 6= i0, i1. Then,
xˆ± εz ∈S for ε > 0 small enough. Thus, 0.5((xˆ+ εz)+ (xˆ− εz)) = xˆ, in contradiction to the
assumption that xˆ ∈ Σ(S ).

Proof: [of proposition 14] We know there is an optimum Q∗. Let Q∗(ν) := ∑νi=1Q
∗
i . Then,
Q∗ maximizes Λν in particular in the simples S = {Q ∈ [0,1]ν | ∑νi=1Qi = Q
∗
(ν)}. Note Q∗ ∈
S . For Q ∈S , we have
Λν(Q) =
ν
N
B
(
Q
∗
(ν)
)
−
ν
∑
u=1
C(Qi).
The first term is constant on S . AsC(.) is concave,Λν(.) is convex on S . There is an extremal
point of S where Λν(.) assumes its maximum on S . With lemma 15 the first result follows.
If additionally B is convex, then Λν (.) is convex on [0,1]
ν , and hence there is an extremal point
of [0,1]ν that maximizes Λν(.).

Proposition 16 If C(.) is convex, then there is one optimal solution Q∗, where all components
are equal.
Proof: We use the nomenclature of proposition 14. OnS ,Λν(.) is concave. Let q
∗=Q∗(ν)/ν ,
and Q˜∗ = (q∗, . . . ,q∗). Then for Q ∈S (that is, ∑νi=1Qi = Q
∗
(ν))
ν
∑
i=1
C(Qi) = ν
ν
∑
i=1
1
ν
C(Qi)≥ νC
(
ν
∑
i=1
1
ν
Qi
)
= νC(Q
∗
(ν)/ν) = νC(q∗).
Thus, for Q ∈S , we have Λν(Q) ≤ Λν(Q˜∗). Since Λν assumes its maximum in S , the result
follows.

Remark 17 If B(.) and C(.) are linear, propositions 14 and 16 are true at the same time. That
is, either Q∗ = (0, . . . ,0), or Q∗ = (1, . . . ,1). Under non-favorable conditions, no QS-individual
cooperates, while under favorable conditions all cooperate. We recover the result from sec-
tion 2.2.
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loc. max.
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q0 1 q0 1
C(q) C(q)
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fully cooperating
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QS−individual,
gradually cooperating
QS−individual,
Q∗ Q∗ q1q1
Λ(q1 , q2) =
ν
N
B(Q∗) − C(q1)− C(q2) Λ(q1, q2) =
ν
N
B(Q∗)− C(q1)− C(q2)
q2 = Q
∗
− q1 q2 = Q
∗
− q1
Fig 3. Effect of concave (left) resp. convex (right) costs. First row:C(q) over q. Second row:
Initial rate Λ2 for two cells and given Q
∗, Λ2(q1,q2) = νNB(Q
∗)−C(q1)−C(q2) with
q1+ q2 = Q
∗, q1 ∈ [0,Q∗]. Third row; left: we obtain a heterogeneous ON/OFF response;
right: we obtain a gradual response.
The next, natural question addresses the dependency of the total amount of cooperativeness in
the optimal strategy on the number (fraction) of cooperators in a colony. Recall that
Q
∗
(ν) :=
ν
∑
i=1
Q∗i
is the total amount of cooperativeness among ν QS-individuals. If C(.) is convex, and B(.)
concave (that is, the all-or-nothing strategy is optimal), Q
∗
(ν) is precisely the number of coop-
erating cells.
Proposition 18 If C(.) is convex, B(.) concave, and Qi ∈ {0,1}, then Q∗(ν) is non-decreasing
in ν .
Proof: SinceC is convex, and B concave,Λν is concave, and hence for the maximizing solution,
Qi ∈ {0,1}. All cells are either ON or OFF.
For symmetry reasons, only the number of cooperating cells matter. Given ν , we may switch on
one cell after the other. If i cells are ON, then the value of Λν is given by λν(i) := νB(i)/N−
iC(1). The additional net benefit (i.e., benefit minus costs) of the i’th cell thus reads
∆λν(i) = λν(i)−λν(i− 1) = ν(B(i)−B(i− 1))/N−C(1).
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Since B(.) is increasing, B(i)−B(i− 1) ≥ 0. As B(.) is concave, the increase in the benefit
decreases in i,
B(i)−B(i− 1)≥ B(i+ 1)−B(i).
Thus, the number of active cells i∗ is either given by i∗ = ν , or by the condition ∆λν(i∗)≥ 0>
∆λν(i
∗+ 1). We have
∆λν+1(i) = (ν + 1)(B(i)−B(i− 1))/N−C(1)≥ ν(B(i)−B(i− 1))/N−C(1) = ∆λν(i).
That is, if the net benefit of the i’th individual is positive in the population of ν QS-individuals,
it is also positive in the population of ν + 1 Qs individuals. Thus, Q
∗
(ν) is non-decreasing.

Proposition 19 If C(.) is concave, and B(.) convex, then Q
∗
(ν) is non-decreasing in ν .
Proof: The basic argument parallels that from proposition 18. This time, we know that all cells
do the very same, Q∗i = q
∗, according to the optimal strategy. We define λν(q) = ν(B(ν q)−
C(q)). Then, λν(q) is convex. As q
∗ maximizes this function, we take q∗ = 0 if λν(q) is de-
creasing on [0,1] (case 1); if it is increasing on [0,1], we take q∗ = 1 (case 2); in case 3, we
know that λν(q) is an unimodal function with an internal maximum; q
∗ ∈ (0,1) is located at
this maximum.
In case 1, Q
∗
(ν) = 0 and hence Q
∗
(ν + 1)≥ Q∗(ν).
For case 2 and 3, compare the derivatives of λν(q) and λν+1(q). Thereto note that B
′(.)> 0. As
B(.) is convex, B′(.) is increasing. If d
dq
λν(q)≥ 0, then
0 ≤ d
dq
λν(q) = ν(B
′(ν q)ν−C′(q))≤ (ν + 1)(B′(ν q)ν−C′(q))
≤ (ν + 1)(B′((ν + 1)q)ν−C′(q))≤ (ν + 1)(B′((ν + 1)q)(ν + 1)−C′(q))
=
d
dq
λν+1(q).
That is, if the net benefit grows for a given q in a population of size ν , it also does so in a
population of size ν + 1. Hence, the optimal value q∗ is non-decreasing in ν , and thus
Q
∗
(ν + 1)≥ ν + 1
ν
Q
∗
(ν)≥ Q∗(ν).

Remark 20 The maximization problem 11 not only applies to a multilevel evolution analysis.
If the average fitness of QS individuals within one single, spatially well mixed population is
to be maximized, we are faced with the very same optimization problem. That is, also in the
case of a single population, we find a heterogeneous/homogeneous response to be optimal, in
dependence on the shape of the costs. However, QS individuals still cannot invade a well-mixed
population of defectors, as the benefit is socialized while the costs are only carried by the QS
trait. The maximization of the average fitness does not necessarily yield an evolutionary stable
state (ESS).
Above we did focus on single bacteria. Now we switch the point of view, and address the
total population. It is of particular interest to understand if the response of the population, which
can be measured by the total PG production rate ∑i=1 νQi, is graded, or all-or-nothing. Basically
we want to know what circumstances favor either a sudden, discontinuous increase in the total
PG production rate if we increase ν , or a continuous increase. In the strict sense, this question
is meaningless as ν ∈ {0, . . .N} is discrete. In order to identify the possibility for a response
depending continuously (in a graded way) on ν , we interpolate the optimization problem and
allow for ν ∈ [0,N].
Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Response of Quorum-Sensing Bacteria 15
Case 1: Convex costs, homogeneous response on the population level,Qi ≡Q for i∈ {0, . . . ,ν}.
Hence, ∑νi=1Qi = ν Q and ∑
ν
i=1C(Qi) = νC(Q). Therefore, eqn. (7) reads
Λν(Q) = ν
{
1
N
B(ν Q)−C(Q)
}
Since we aim to find Q ∈ [0,1] that maximizes this expression, we can maximize as well (ν ∈
[0,N] fixed)
Λ˜ν (Q) =
1
N
B(ν Q)−C(Q). (8)
Case 2: Concave costs, ON/OFF response on the individual level, Qi ∈ {0,1}. According to
proposition 14, there might be one single bacterium with 0 < Qi < 1; if ν is large, we can
neglect this single bacterium and assume Qi ∈ {0,1}. Let η denote the fraction of QS bac-
teria in the ON state, that is, the number of ON bacteria are η ν . Then, ∑i=1 νQi = ην , and
∑νi=1C(Qi) = ν ηC(1). In the second case, eqn. (7) can be written as (note thatQ=(Q1, . . . ,Qν )
is characterized by η)
Λν (Q) = ν
{
1
N
B(ν η)−ηC(1)
}
where we aim to find η ∈ [0,1] maximizing Λν . As before, we may consider as well the maxi-
mization problem (ν ∈ [0,N] fixed)
Λˆν (η) =
1
N
B(ν η)−ηC(1). (9)
If we compare the two optimization problems for case 1 (eqn. (8)) and case 2 (eqn. (9)), we
find that they look very similar. Q ∈ [0,1] is the normalized PG production, identical in all cells,
while η ∈ [0,1] refers to the fraction of activated cells. In that, Q and η characterize the activa-
tion level of the population. Experimental results (see discussion below) indicate that the costs
depend in first order linearly on the PG produced, and convexity/concavity of the cost function
is due to a higher order perturbation. In this case, C(Q) ≈ QC(1). That is, (8) and (9) have a
similar solution. If the optimization problem is stable (in the sense that a small perturbation of
the functional that is to optimize only leads to a small perturbation of the solution), then Q≈ η .
In both cases, the optimal PG production is a certain fraction of the maximal PG production
possible. In convex cost, all cells contribute equally to the PG production, while in concave
costs, a fraction of QS individuals contribute at maximal rate, while the others do not contribute
at all.
A typical choice for B(.) is a Hill function,
B(x) =
axn
b+ xn
.
The saturation of the benefit models spatial effects, while n > 1 models synergistic effects.
As depicted in figure 4, we expect a graded response for n = 1, while a jump-like response
is possible for n = 2. While the total PG production is non-decreasing in ν (in accordance to
the proposition above), the fraction of activated cells does not monotonously depend on ν . The
unimodal shape is a consequence of the saturating benefit. These findings are in line with similar
investigations in [26].
From these considerations we obtain the following picture: The total PG production is a
non-decreasing function on the number of QS-individuals in the population. If the number of
QS individuals is increased, the total PG production may increase continuously in a gradual
response, or the total PG production is switched on at a certain threshold. Note, that even if
16 Hense, Burkhard et al.
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the population responds discontinuously, in many cases the population does not jump to the
maximal PG production possible, but only jumps to an intermediate PG production rate (see
figure 4 (e), (f)). Which of the two cases is realizes mainly depends on the nonlinear shape of
the benefit B( .). In contrast, how single bacteria contribute to the total PG production mainly
depends on the shape of the costs C( .): For convex costs, all QS individuals contribute at the
same degree, while for concave cost functions a fraction of bacteria contribute at maximal rate
while the other do not contribute at all. Of course, these different responses at single-cell-level
are only possible if not all cells are in the OFF or in the ON state.
2.4 The shape of costs
The present article does not aim to model molecular mechanisms, but concentrates on evolution.
However, as the shape of the cost function is central, we discuss some biochemical aspects more
in detail that may contribute to a nonlinear shape of the cost function.
There is experimental evidence that in many cases the running costs for protein production is
proportional to the rate at which the protein is formed [20, 24, 32]. These results can be simply
understood: The production of one single enzyme has given costs ce, and this enzyme produces
PG at rate γ for a certain time T . The production of one unit PG is given by some constant ct .
The total costs caused by one enzyme over time T is given by ct γ T + ce, and the amount of PG
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produced by γ T . The costs per PG is ce/(γ T )+ct . In order to have more PG at time T , we need
more enzymes. The resulting relation between the amount of PG and the total costs is strictly
linear,
C(PG) =
ce
γ T
PG+ ct PG.
The second term, ct PG, relates to the actual PG production costs, while the first term is due to
the “infrastructure” (enzyme production).
In our thought model, we implicitly made two assumptions: (a) The costs per active enzyme
is independent on the number of enzymes, and (b) all enzymes are active over the complete
time interval [0,T ]. Both assumptions are not necessarily given. In the following, we discuss
these two assumptions based on toy models. Afterwards, we consider the effect of incompatible
metabolic processes and of privileged share on the cost function.
Costs per active enzyme can be non-linear: A famous PG under the control of QS is light
production by Vibrio fischeri. Light production is due to luciferase, a heterodimer that consists
of two subunits, α and β . The subunits are coded by the genes luxA and luxB [8], which are
located in the lux cassette of Vibirio fischeri. The heterodimer luciferase [αβ ] is the result of an
equilibrium reaction [8], α +β ⇋ [αβ ]. We neglect that the situation is even more complex, as
luciferase has several conformations [8]. The equilibrium of the reaction is given by
K =
[αβ ]
α β
for some constant K. If we assume that a cell produces the same number n of both units, then
n= α +[αβ ] = β +[αβ ]. The number of luciferase molecules reads
[αβ ] = Kα β = K (n− [αβ ])2 ⇒ n= [αβ ]+
√
[αβ ]
K
.
Even if the enzyme itself is the PG (as in the excretion of exoenzymes), this formula indicates
that the costs per unit PG are concave. However, we proceed to discuss a PG produced by the
enzyme. For a time interval [0,T ], the number of PG units produced are PG= γ T [αβ ], and the
total costs induced areC = ce n+ ct γ T [αβ ] = ce n+ ct PG. Hence,
n=C(PG) = ce
{
1
T γ
PG+
√
1
γ T K
√
PG
}
+ ct PG.
As the second derivative of C(PG) is positive, this function is concave. We have one term that
expresses the direct costs for the PG produced, and in addition a non-linear term that character-
izes the efficiency of the pathway in dependency of its activity. The costs for the “infrastructure”
of the pathway becomes non-linear.
Timing of enzyme production can induce nonlinear costs: We again formulate a most simple
model to investigate this effect. Let e(t) denote the amount of operating enzymes within a cell,
and pg(t) the amount of PG produced by this cell until time t. This PG could be, for example,
exopolysaccharides. If η is the production rate of enzymes, while enzymes produce PG at rate
γ , we have
e˙= η , p˙g= γ e.
The total costs at time t are due to enzyme production (ceη) and due to PG production (γ ect ).
Hence, for the metabolic costs c(t) incurred in the time interval [0, t], we have
c˙= η ce+ γ ect .
We start with e(0) = pg(0) = c(0) = 0. Therefore, e(t) = η t. At time T we obtain the total
amount of PG produced and the total costs C
PG=
1
2
γ η T 2, C = η ceT +
1
2
γ η ct T
2.
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Therewith,
C(PG) =
√
2η ce√
γ
√
PG + ct PG.
Again, we find a concave dependency of the costs on the amount of PG produced. And again,
the costs consist of a term measuring the direct costs for the PG produced, and a second term
related to the efficiency of an enzyme, that is, the average amount of PG produced per enzyme.
Not the costs for PG production itself, but the costs related to the infrastructure are non-linear
(concave) in the last two models.
Molecular mechanisms that may lead to a convex shape are completely different: The pro-
duction effort per unit PG becomes increasingly higher with an increasing production rate. This
is the case if e.g. waste products of the PG production accumulate and are detrimental for the
cell. Ackermann [1] describes similar ideas to explain phenotypic heterogeneity if different,
mutually exclusive tasks are to be performed by a bacterial population.
A possibility to influence the shape of the (net) costs is privileged share: if part of the PG
produced is kept private by the producing bacterium, then the net costs are given by the costs
(in the strict sense) minus the benefit due to the part of the PG that is kept privately. In that, the
shape of the net costs depends on both, the shape of the costs in the strict sense, and the shape
of the benefit. It is possible to “overwrite” convexity of the costs by privileged share.
The practical importance of the effects discussed here are unclear. Their relevance needs to
be determined by experimental approaches.
3 Discussion
The nonlinear characteristics of the benefit controls the PG production on the population level,
while the nonlinear characteristics of the costs controls the PG production on the individual
level. If the number of QS individuals increases, the total PG production by the QS population
is non-decreasing. The exact way how the total PG production changes with the number of
QS individuals – if there is a gradual increase, or a sudden jump from no PG production to a
high PG production – mainly depends on the shape of the benefit. In contrast, mainly the shape
of the cost function determines how this total PG production rate is realized on the individual
level. Given a number of QS individuals, a certain optimal degree of cooperativeness on the
population level can be reached either when all cells contribute in the same way, or when some
cells do not contribute at all, while others cooperate as much as possible. The optimal strategy
depends on the shape of the cost function. If the PG production is discounted, such that for
a cell the production of two PG units is cheaper than that of two times the costs for one unit
(concave costs), the population is better off if some individuals produce heavily and others not
at all (heterogeneous strategy). If the situation were the other way around (convex costs), then
we would predict a homogeneous response.
At a second glance, the finding that mainly the shape of the cost function is decisive for the
individual response is intuitive: PGs are assumed to be available in the same amount to all in-
dividuals. All cells benefit in the same way, independently of the degree of cooperativeness
a given cell chooses. As the selection happens based on fitness differences, a benefit that im-
proves the fitness of all cells uniformly is of minor importance for competition within a colony.
As usual, this observation is true as long as the benefit and the costs contribute in an additive
way to the fitness. We might speculate that in a first step a homogeneous response evolves, that
in a second step, driven by evolutionary forces, is adapted to a slightly more efficient, heteroge-
neous response. However, in multilevel evolution, also the benefit difference between different
groups is of importance. While costs play the larger role within groups, the net benefit is of
importance in the competition between groups.
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We speculate that convex costs are frequent, as e.g. enzymes necessary for PG represent
an additional cost and have to be produced for PG production. Hence, we also expect that
phenotypic heterogeneity in the PG production can be often found in nature.
QS populations with a high density of individuals may nevertheless not lead to a complete
activation of the population. Experiments show that, even at high concentrations of QS indi-
viduals, we still find heterogeneity. Naively stated, we would expect that the total population
of QS individuals is activated if the population density becomes large and very large. However,
in [3, 44] it is reported that this is not the case for a population of Vibrio harveyi resp. Vibrio
fischeri, through additional QS signals, are able to active also the non-induced part of the pop-
ulation. Also, this finding can be interpreted in the light of our theoretical study: Each increase
of the cooperativeness comes not only with an increase of benefit but also with an increase of
costs. The increase of the benefit is likely to be modeled by a saturation function. If the ben-
efit approaches its plateau before all individuals are fully activated, it is advantageous for the
population if not the maximal potential for PG production is exploited. In the case of concave
costs (inducing a heterogeneous response), part of the population is fully induced, and another
part not induced at all. The alternative is more expensive, i.e., that all individuals are homo-
geneously halted in their production, leading to the case of a homogeneous response (convex
costs). The extra expense consists of the cost of production setup, e.g., enzymes necessary for
PG production. In a homogeneous response, all individuals invest into the setup costs, and face
the risk of not using them to their maximum potential.
Molecular mechanisms for heterogeneity. Positive feedback in many QS systems promoted
an understanding that QS coordinates group behavior in an all-or-none fashion. This seems
to contradict the idea of phenotypic heterogeneity [29]. However, recent publications revealed
how all-or-none switching at the cellular level can lead to either all-or-none or graded responses
at the population level [19, 36, 57]. Stochastic differences in QS protein levels between cells,
which might affect both signal production and/or perception, can be augmented by the positive
feedback. If the coupling of cells via QS is very tight, then this heterogeneity can be overcome.
However, the strength of coupling between cells, essentially the degree of self- or between-cell
signaling, can be controlled. QS parameters such as signal production rate, secretion rate and
receptor concentration determine to which degree the signal is shared or retained intracellu-
larly [19]. As a consequence, activation remains all-or-none at the cellular level, but can switch
between all-or-none and graded (heterogeneous) at the population level. In fact, QS parameters
have been shown to be under control of extracellular and intracellular conditions [39].
In the scenario described above, phenotypic heterogeneity emerges within the QS system itself.
Alternatively, heterogeneity of QS controlled behavior can also be generated down-stream of
QS signaling. The “Competence Stimulating Protein“ (CSP) in Streptococcus mutans evokes
a response in all cells of a population by phosphorylation of ComE via activation of the his-
tidine kinase ComD [33]. Although the underlying mechanisms are not understood in detail,
heterogeneities arising in the signaling cascade downstream of ComD finally result in a CSP-
controlled induction of three phenotypic different subpopulations of competent, non-competent
and autolytic cells. In B. subtilis, the comQXPA QS system regulates the rate of competence
induction by controlling the competence master regulator ComK [51].
QS individuals are able to circumvent Hamilton’s rule. In a multilevel evolutionary setting,
QS individuals are able to invade residents which are defectors as well as constitutive coopera-
tors. Constitutive cooperators can only invade defectors if Hamilton’s rule c < br is given. QS
individuals only require that c < b. For QS populations the relatedness r does not play a role:
Their advantage is that they can measure the relatedness [50] in each single colony, and respond
accordingly. We recovered and extended the result [2], where competition experiments and the
conceptual framework for the Price equation is used to show that QS individuals are able to
fight cheaters by negative frequency-dependent selection. The assumption of a homogeneous
response forces an even more restrictive interpretation: QS individuals with a homogeneous
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strategy do not really estimate the relatedness – QS individuals are even more selfish. They
only start to cooperate, if cooperation pays for each single individual. QS with a homogeneous
response can be viewed as a selfish strategy that seeks to maximize the fitness of single cells.
Heterogeneous response is efficiency sensing in the light of Fisher’s fundamental theorem
of selection. In the view of evolutionary pressure, a population maximizes its average fitness.
Therefore, QS is best interpreted as efficiency sensing [27]: the QS mechanism allows to esti-
mate the effect of an action. At this point, we need to refine the term “effect”. Is this the effect for
the benefit of one single individual, or of the population?Often, one only considers the fitness of
single individuals. However, fitness optimization of single individuals and fitness optimization
of the population are only equivalent if there is no interaction between the individuals. This is
surely not the case in cooperation via PG.
If all individuals optimize their own fitness, all individuals of an isogenic population exposed to
the same environment should behave in the very same manner. Experiments as well as our mod-
eling approach indicates that a heterogeneous phenotype can be favorable. Some QS-bacteria
act as phenotypic “cheaters”, benefiting from the PG produced by fellow bacteria, but not con-
tributing to the PG production. Quorum sensing can still be seen as efficiency sensing, but not
maximizing the fitness of each single cell, but rather on the population level. According to
Fisher’s fundamental theorem of evolution, the mean fitness of a population is maximized, not
the fitness of single individuals [30]. We are faced with a similar effect that stabilizes e.g. the
altruistic behavior of persister cells. In the context of multiplayer game theory, heterogeneous
strategies appear if the benefit is chosen to be nonlinear, e.g. as a threshold function [14].
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